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ABSTRACT 
Gathering and analyzing suspicious activity is a core element in the prevention of 
crime and terrorism. The Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and the 
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) program is an attempt to address this issue, 
but it creates human and systemic barriers to information access—the same 
barriers that existed prior to 9/11. The SAR program, through its process-related 
policies, limits critical information from entering the shared space for analysis. 
These limitations are two-fold: Information must be specifically prepared for 
submission by a human being who recognizes that a potential nexus to terrorism 
might exist and decides to act upon this recognition; and, once submitted, each 
data element must be individually vetted and approved by more human analysts. 
Removing the dual limitations of lack of complete operating picture (based upon 
the limited information made available for vetting) and dependence on human 
frailty will provide a more effective platform for the identification and mitigation of 
possible pre-terrorist incident indicators. This thesis provides an overview of the 
SAR program and compares and contrasts it with more mature platforms that 
better meet their objectives, and provides recommendations on how the ISE/ 
SAR enterprise can be improved. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
A.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The 9/11 Commission Report identified a key structural failure of the 
intelligence community, both before and after 9/11, as the organization of 
national intelligence around the “collection disciplines of home agencies,” which 
makes it impossible to connect the dots due to a lack of integrated information 
(The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 408). Gathering and analyzing 
suspicious activity is a core element in the prevention of crime and terrorism. The 
efforts of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and the Nationwide 
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) are an attempt to address this 
issue, but it creates human and systemic barriers to information access—the 
same barriers that existed prior to 9/11. The SAR program should be this nation’s 
best effort to prevent another terrorist attack. It should be built upon a foundation 
that maximizes its potential for success. Best practices from all available sectors 
should be leveraged to ensure optimal functionality. Key characteristics from 
reference models that have achieved demonstrable success should be explored 
and implemented wherever feasible. By exploring how other models do things 
better, important lessons can be learned that can drive critical improvements to 
the SAR program.  
This thesis demonstrates that, although it has the appropriate goals, the 
SAR program does not live up to its promise and cannot meet its desired 
outcomes. This platform did not prevent the Times Square bomber from almost 
succeeding, in fact, “…the fact that the U.S. was unable to stop this plot earlier, 
despite sufficient intelligence and knowledge that terrorists have been attempting 
these types of attacks since 9/11, is nothing to be celebrated” (McNeill, 2010, p. 
1) and supports the notion that current information-sharing policies and programs 
have not yet realized their preventative goals for several reasons. 
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 The SAR program limits potentially critical information from entering 
the assessment environment, and this limited flow of information 
does not adequately encompass the range of information 
necessary to form the basis for identification of potential pre-
terrorist incident indicators effectively. 
 The SAR process requires that individual analysts at the agency 
level assess each piece of potentially critical information to 
determine whether or not a nexus to terrorism exists, before the 
information can be shared in the environment. This approach forms 
a critical point of failure, as the process relies upon the imagination 
of a single person recognizing the potential value of a piece of 
information before it can even be considered for further 
assessment, let alone enter the ISE for use by other follow-on 
analytics activities.  
This thesis argues that the current ISE design limits key information critical 
to the identification of indicators of terrorist activity from entering the assessment 
space and does not allow advanced analytics to occur, and unless the design is 
modified, the efficacy of the platform will remain limited. To improve 
effectiveness, the ISE must address these shortcomings. More complete 
information must be provided, and human dependencies must be removed. 
Successful models in other disciplines and in other places can be used as 
references. The military’s use of comprehensive, multi-mode situational 
awareness indicators is one such model, in which all available information is 
available for continuous assessment. The United Kingdom’s Police National 
Database is another, in which a wide-ranging, inclusive, and non-limiting platform 
allows investigators to see all relevant information from across jurisdictional and 
geographic boundaries. FinCEN, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, is a 
comprehensive environment designed to identify illegal activity in the financial 
sector, which contains mandatory submissions from across the banking 
community. In all these cases, the limiting factor of a human being reviewing and 
vetting discrete elements of information without understanding potential 
relevance to situations of which they may not be aware is not present as a point 
of failure.  
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Big Data is an emerging computing concept that involves assessing vast 
amounts of information at scales not previously possible to identify patterns and 
trends and make connections across these massive amounts of data in ways that 
would not be possible without access to these large datasets and the tools 
necessary to exploit them (Dumbill, 2012, p. 37). Big Data describes the 
exploitation of massive amounts of information to identify patterns from which 
action can be taken (Brehm, 2012, p. 10). Exploring data analytics capabilities 
from various sectors, and examining the arena of Big Data and its potential to 
derive meaning from vast sets of information, will provide the potential for this 
environment to improve the signal-to-noise ratio that might otherwise exist given 
the large volume of unfiltered data elements that it comprises. For Big Data to be 
effective, three things are necessary: Volume (having access to extremely large 
sets of information), Velocity (the rate at which information enters the 
assessment space for analytics activities to occur), and Variety (a diverse range 
of information upon which to perform analytics).  
Consider the following:  
A disastrous “bolt from the blue” attack kills thousands; enraged 
politicians and pundits point fingers; committees gravely 
recommend changes; a massive reorganization of the nation's 
security and intelligence organs follows. (Colby, 2007, p. 71)  
This environment is the outcome of events that followed 9/11, December 
7, 1941 at Pearl Harbor, October 1973 in Israel’s Yom Kippur War, the fall of 
British Singapore to Japan in 1942, and “even the Roman Senate’s reaction to 
the… irruption of Hannibal into the Italian peninsula” (Colby, 2007, p. 71). The 
ISE platform is the latest attempt to redress a modern, yet not unfamiliar, failure 
of intelligence. The system itself has inherent weaknesses and relies upon the 
intrinsically biased and potentially flawed capacity of a human analyst, who 
controls the gates of entry for any SAR submission into the assessment 
environment. The platform can and must be improved to increase its efficacy.  
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B.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis asks the question: Is the Information Sharing Environment an 
effective platform? To provide a useful answer, a working definition of effective, 
when used in this context, must be provided. To provide a basis for an answer, 
the intent of the environment itself suggests a useful reference. To avoid another 
catastrophic outcome, such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, such a 
model must be able to provide actionable, relevant, timely intelligence from its 
inputs. The outputs of the model must allow users of the platform to identify, 
understand, and act on warnings before another catastrophe occurs.  
C.  METHODOLOGY 
This thesis examines the baseline problem space (the ISE) to explore the 
ideal characteristics that an effective model must encompass to address the 
problem within the framework of Big Data (the Police National Database, 
Persistent Surveillance, and the FinCEN), and compare and contrast key 
characteristics of the ISE with attributes of the reference systems. Chapter IV 
explains the concept of Big Data (evaluating vast amounts of information using 
tools to identify trends and patterns that would not be possible without advanced 
analytical capabilities). 
This thesis identifies components of an effective model and contrasts how 
these differ from the ISE. Persistent Surveillance provides one such model, 
which is used primarily in a military intelligence context to describe the integration 
of data largely from sensors and systems, such as satellites, motion detectors, 
and UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), to allow analysts to “rapidly search, 
correlate, fuse and visualize” across large datasets (Kimmons, 2008). The Police 
National Database is the United Kingdom’s attempt to integrate a wide range of 
police databases together to form an information-sharing platform. FinCEN is an 
outgrowth of the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act and provides perhaps the most mature, 
robust reference system for comparison—a system designed to assess vast 
amounts of data to detect indicators of financial fraud and potential terrorist 
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funding activities. Between 2002 and 2011, FinCEN has supported 378 requests 
related to terrorist financing and 1,148 related to money laundering activities from 
local, state and federal law enforcement agencies, with 15,741 persons of 
interest identified in these requests (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
Annual Report 2011, 2011, p. 51). FinCEN was able to share valuable 
information with international financial fraud units following the Madrid bombings 
and the United Kingdom’s 2006 discovery of a terrorist plot involving trans-
Atlantic commercial airliners, which resulted in “relevant information” involving 
suspects (Werner, 2006, p. 12).  
Chapter II provides background on the Information Sharing Environment 
and describes how the events of September 11, 2001 represented a failure of the 
intelligence community to “connect the dots.”  
Chapter III gives a brief literature review, which notes the general lack of 
performance metrics or efficacy evaluations of the ISE itself. Little research exists 
on how the program has performed so far, except for a single report identifying 
the number of SAR entries for the period 2010–2011. Ample literature exists on 
how the intelligence fusion process itself should work, as well as some additional 
literature evaluating the ISE in the context of this framework. Research on the 
limits of human imagination and its role in intelligence failures is identified, along 
with work in the area of human frailty.  
Chapter IV describes the models that will serve as references for 
comparison to the ISE: the use of business intelligence and Big Data, the Police 
National Database in the United Kingdom, the concept of Persistent Surveillance 
in the military space, and the FinCEN. Since a distinct lack of defined metrics for 
success with respect to the ISE occurs, some potential metrics are proposed, 
including the number of criminal terrorist investigations initiated, the number of 
terrorists identified, terrorists arrested, terrorist cells identified, terrorist plots 
identified, terrorist plots prevented, and so forth. Key characteristics of effective 
models are described, and the ISE is evaluated using each of these measures 
(spoiler: it fails). The ISE is evaluated using a Business Intelligence maturity 
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model, in which it scores at the low end of both the Business Value and 
Complexity scales (i.e., it is an immature model). Several illustrative tables are 
included. One compares the ISE with the Police National Database, and another 
utilizes the three performance measures of Big Data (volume, velocity, and 
variety) and compares the ISE with FinCEN. Weaknesses of the ISE are 
discussed in more depth, including its lack of information and its dependency on 
people, which leads to a discussion of human frailty.  
Chapter V compares and contrasts key characteristics of the ISE with 
reference models including the Police National Database, the military’s use of 
persistent surveillance, and FinCEN. In key performance areas, these reference 
models are more mature in their ability to meet desired outcomes. Tables are 
presented that allow these models to be compared with the ISE. Potential metrics 
for assessment of the ISE are proposed within the framework of its defined 
objectives.  
Chapter VI presents a conclusion. The ISE is not an effective platform, if 
effectiveness is defined as meeting the charge of The 9/11 Commission Report 
and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 
Recommendations are provided, which may be summarized as follows. The ISE 
needs to become more like the reference models discussed in this thesis—the 
Police National Database, FinCEN, the military’s concept of Persistent 
Surveillance—and single points of failure need to be reduced or eliminated 
(removal of human dependencies). Barriers include legal, policy, privacy, and 
cost issues. To overcome these barriers, a bottom-up approach that uses 
technology itself to build in appropriate privacy controls and depends upon local 
and regional fusion centers is proposed, which will help overcome privacy 
concerns, as a diversification of control and decentralization will occur. This 
“system of systems” is described as the multi-ISE; a series of databases 
managed at the local agency level that forms a comprehensive, multi-mode 
platform that meets privacy and policy guidelines and removes key barriers to 
efficacy present in the current system design.  
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT (ISE) 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were the first significant 
foreign attacks on United States soil in almost 200 years—since the War of 1812, 
and represented a stunning failure of the intelligence community to “interpret, 
analyze, and share” information that might have provided pre-incident indicators, 
or early warnings, prior to the attacks themselves (Chambliss, 2005). The 9/11 
Commission Report describes a crescendo of intelligence indicators in the 
months prior to the attacks, with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director 
George Tenet describing the system in the intelligence world as “blinking red,” 
and suggesting that it could “not get any worse” (The 9/11 Commission Report, 
2004, p. 259).  
Mark Lowenthal suggests that the various post-mortems describing 
intelligence failures of 9/11 agree on several key points (Lowenthal, 2008, pp. 
303–315). 
 The intelligence community failed to share information quickly or 
widely enough, and that stovepipes defined a lack of sharing across 
agency boundaries, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and the CIA, partially due to restrictions that prohibited the 
sharing of such information unless a “need to know” existed and 
partially resulting from institutional arrogance and a failure of these 
agencies to get along.  
 A “failure to warn,” existed, which was characterized by intelligence 
agencies having information but failing to use it to generate a 
warning that might have prevented the attacks. A Presidential Daily 
Brief (PDB) of August 6, 2001, 36 days prior to September 11, is 
often cited as an example, although it did not specifically mention 
planes targeting the World Trade Center. 
 The famous failure to connect the dots, in which information was 
available but was not connected. Lowenthal disagrees with the 
oversimplification of this term, and compares it literally to child’s 
play; a situation in which a child is presented with numbered dots to  
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connect, and is easily able to connect them because they are 
numbered and because exactly enough dots are available to form 
the desired picture—no more and no less. 
What is important for purposes of this section’s discussion is not whether 
or not it was in fact easy to connect the dots, but that the failures described 
above led directly to the development of the ISE and an attempt to remedy them. 
The following section describes the environment.  
B.  DESCRIPTION OF INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT 
The ISE is sponsored and funded by the Office of the Program Manager of 
the Information Sharing Environment, established under the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). This environment is designed as 
a "low risk approach for testing and evaluating ISE policies, business processes, 
capabilities, architectures, and standards by sponsoring efforts that implement 
and evaluate solutions to operational needs in a relatively controlled 
environment" (Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative Concept of 
Operations, 2011, sec. 5.1). 
1. Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) 
In December 2008, the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) 
Initiative (NSI) Concept of Operations was published and described the 
suspicious activity reporting information gathering, processing, analytics, and 
production cycle (Final Report: Information Sharing Environment Suspicious 
Activity Reporting Evaluation Environment, 2010, p. 13). This process is depicted 
in Figure 1 (Final Report: Information Sharing Environment Suspicious Activity 
Reporting Evaluation Environment, 2010, p. 14). 
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Figure 1.   Nationwide SAR Cycle 
As noted above, front-line personnel at federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies receive training to recognize and identify behavior and 
incidents indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism and a trained 
expert then reviews this information to confirm a possible nexus to terrorism. To 
share information with external agencies in the ISE platform, a law enforcement 
officer must determine that suspicious activity that might have a possible 
connection to terrorism has been identified. That information must then be 
submitted to the state or local fusion center. An intelligence analyst must review it 
to determine if it meets the criteria for sharing. Presuming the analyst makes the 
determination that the activity meets the criteria for submission; it is entered into 
the information-sharing environment and can then be accessed by human 
analysts for possible connection with other intelligence information (Bjelopera, 
2010, p. 8).  
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Figure 2 is a representation of the current process (which is “Single 
Mode,” or reliant upon only one input source), and the preferred environment 
(which is “Multi Mode,” or reliant upon a comprehensive set of input indicators). 
 
 
Figure 2.   Current vs. Preferred ISE/SAR Environment 
The general steps in the intelligence process are as follows. 
1.  Requirements 
2.  Collection 
3.  Processing and exploitation (“fusion”) 
4.  Analysis and production  
5.  Dissemination 
6.  Consumption 
7.  Feedback 
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The SAR program depends upon two limitations that create a problem of 
human frailty. One is that a human being must become aware of “suspicious 
activity” and decide that it is suspicious and needs to be reported and then report 
the activity. The second is that a human being at a fusion center must review the 
reported activity and determine that this activity has a nexus to terrorism and thus 
should be pushed to the (ISE for review and analysis. Consequently, , human 
frailty limits the effectiveness of the platform.  
An effective model will remove human frailty at one or both of these 
stages. For example, more information available to the second-level fusion 
center reviewer would create a more comprehensive “common operating 
picture,” available in the form of analytical data aggregation products, such as 
maps, dashboards, and other visualization and inquiry tools, and would solve the 
problem of depending upon a human being to determine that a single, possibly 
discrete component of information rises to the level of suspicious activity that 
needs to be documented. In this alternative approach, the fusion center analyst 
would have access to real-time or near real-time information from source 
systems (such as incident reports, arrest reports, calls for service, and 
documentation of suspicious activity stops) from which to assess information by 
using analytics tools to perform more effective analysis.  
Another alternative solution would involve providing common operating 
picture information from across multiple jurisdictions to a national fusion center, 
in which analytics could occur across a wider range of potential indicators to 
identify patterns of activity that might be crossing jurisdictional boundaries and 
would otherwise be undetectable. Criteria to judge existing policies might include 
a number of investigations initiated based upon SAR submissions (potentially 
with a review of their outcomes) and an assessment of how existing policies 
would have worked to identify earlier terrorist plots (i.e., 9/11 or previous World 
Trade Center bombing or foiled plots. As a recent (December 2011) 
Congressional Research Service report suggests, it is difficult to determine 
whether or not the SAR program is successful. Are the number of SARs 
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produced/shared relevant metrics, how can one determine if the SARs produced 
and shared are meaningful, and how can one determine if the correct 
connections are being made across reports (Bjelopera, 2010, p. 17). 
Characteristics of the SAR program are compared and contrasted with 
characteristics of more effective models.  
The purpose of the ISE is to provide the “right information to the right 
people in time to prevent terrorist attacks” by providing access to the necessary 
information from the multiple and often disparate systems at the local, federal, 
and state levels (Paul, 2010, p. 36). To achieve this goal, the SAR process 
follows the traditional intelligence cycle: (1) requirements, (2) collection, (3) 
processing and exploitation, (4) analysis and production, (5) dissemination, (6) 
consumption, and (7) feedback (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 66). The initial process 
challenge is in the collection phase, in which a lack of control and consistency 
exists in the quality and type of information being collected and submitted into the 
environment. Under the current SAR protocol, this thesis argues that 
requirements process is too restrictive to allow for the volume of information to 
enter the assessment space.  
2. Submission Characteristics 
A SAR submission might be useful in two ways. One is the “direct” 
approach, in which a specific report itself is a clear indication of a terrorist threat, 
and this indication is apparent to each reviewer at each stage in the process: The 
collector (i.e., the police officer), the processor (i.e., the system collecting and 
transmitting the information), the analyst, and the process for proper 
dissemination. In this ideal approach, the system works as designed. 
Unfortunately, this happens very rarely. For example, in 2009–2010, the FBI 
reported that 3,400 SAR submissions were entered into the system (FBI—
Connecting Dots with EGuardian, 2008), with only 56 of them (2%) meriting an 
investigation (Straw, 2010).  
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The “direct” approach further presumes that the law enforcement officer 
and the analyst have the foresight to determine that one piece of information, at 
the time it is identified and analyzed, might have a nexus to terrorism—or, to 
quote the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism from the Bush 
Administration, that “…[i]nformation acquired for one purpose, or under one set 
of authorities, might provide unique insights when combined… with seemingly 
unrelated information from other sources” (NSIS—Introduction and Overview, 
2011). Presuming these participants have such foresight, the entity responsible 
for dissemination must also come to the realization that the information is 
important enough to be distributed, and then must distribute it to the right 
recipients, all of which must happen in the correct sequence and with the proper 
timing to prevent an event or events from occurring.  
The second way a SAR submission might be useful provides insight into 
the great potential of the system: The “indirect” approach occurs when data 
analytics is used to identify unusual occurrences in baseline data automatically. 
For this to work, the system must have access to a “huge, relatively consistent, 
and comprehensive [dataset] to ensure robust analysis” (Steiner, 2010). In the 
intelligence community, this problem is known as “noise versus signals” or 
“wheat versus chaff,” which is the notion that the important information is often 
buried within a large amount of “noise” (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 72).  
3.  Desired Outcome 
The formal, stated goal of the ISE is to comply with IRTPA, which requires 
the President to establish an ISE “for the sharing of terrorism information in a 
manner consistent with national security and with applicable legal standards 
relating to privacy and civil liberties,” and which provides a very broad mandate 
with the following requirements, as quoted directly from the Act itself (Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, 2004): 
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(2) ATTRIBUTES.—The President shall… ensure that the ISE 
provides and facilitates the means for sharing terrorism information 
among all appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, and 
the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and 
technologies. The President shall, to the greatest extent 
practicable, ensure that the ISE provides the functional equivalent 
of, or otherwise supports, a decentralized, distributed, and 
coordinated environment 
that— 
(A) connects existing systems, where appropriate, provides no 
single points of failure, and allows users to share information 
among agencies, between levels of government, and, as 
appropriate, with the private sector; 
(B) ensures direct and continuous online electronic access to 
information; 
(C) facilitates the availability of information in a form and manner 
that facilitates its use in analysis, investigations and operations; 
(D) builds upon existing systems capabilities currently in use across 
the Government; 
E) employs an information access management approach that 
controls access to data rather than just systems and networks, 
without sacrificing security; 
(F) facilitates the sharing of information at and across all levels of 
security; 
(G) provides directory services, or the functional equivalent, for 
locating people and information; 
(H) incorporates protections for individuals’ privacy and civil 
liberties; and 
(I) incorporates strong mechanisms to enhance accountability and 
facilitate oversight, including audits, authentication, and access 
controls… 
 15
(4) TERRORISM INFORMATION.—The term ‘‘terrorism 
information’’ means all information, whether collected, produced, or 
distributed by intelligence, law enforcement, military, homeland 
security, or other activities relating to— 
(A) the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, 
vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or activities of 
foreign or international terrorist groups or individuals, or of domestic 
groups or individuals 
involved in transnational terrorism; 
(B) threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United 
States, United States persons, or United States interests, or to 
those of other nations; 
(C) communications of or by such groups or individuals; 
or 
(D) groups or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or 
associated with such groups or individuals. 
The latest (2011) ISE Annual Report to Congress reiterates the objectives 
as outlined in the Act and highlights recent emphasis on work in the area of 
developing a governance structure to establish standards for data sharing, create 
baseline capabilities for fusion centers, and enhance information sharing across 
public and private sectors. It also presents a broad definition of the ISE itself as 
“infrastructure and capabilities,” which extends the parameters of the 
environment and includes many such capabilities not directly accessible from the 
ISE assessment space, a notion that is reinforced by several examples given of 
potential use cases, one of which involves a police officer using the National 
Crime Information Center (NCIC) to conduct a query, the results of which direct 
the officer to contact the Terrorist Screening Center to assess a potential match 
against the terrorist watch list; while another example depicts an intelligence 
analyst utilizing the Library of National Intelligence to develop new intelligence  
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products (ISE Annual Report to the Congress, 2011, p. 3). Not all these systems 
are part of an integrated, searchable database, as the first example notes, an 
officer has to utilize one system (NCIC) and then is referred to another.  
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided background on the development of the ISE, which 
was recommended following the intelligence failures that preceded 9/11. These 
failures related to a failure on the part of the intelligence community to share 
information with each other, a failure to warn, or act upon information that these 
agencies possessed; and the famous failure to "connect the dots" across 
available data points. The ISE and SAR NSI were described, along with an 
overview of the seven-step intelligence cycle (requirements, collection, 
processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination, 
consumption, and feedback). The SAR NSI's exposure to human frailty was 
identified as a barrier to the program's effectiveness. An effective model must 
remove this human weakness where possible. Instead of limiting information 
from entering the assessment environment, fusion center analysts need access 
to a wider range of indicators than just SAR submissions. When examining the 
seven-step intelligence process, the current SAR protocol is too restrictive in the 
requirements process. 
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III.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
The first topical literature describes the ISE itself and provides a rationale 
and basis for its development, and discusses a key information source for the 
ISE, Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR). The foundational document for the ISE is 
probably The 9/11 Commission Report, which framed the failures that led to 9/11. 
It identified a key structural failure of the intelligence community, both before and 
after 9/11, as the organization of national intelligence around the “collection 
disciplines of home agencies,” which makes it impossible to connect the dots due 
to lack of integrated information (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 408). 
Therefore, this report is the key motivation for the development of the ISE. 
Various publications describe the goals of the ISE and provide an 
overview and assessment of implementation efforts to date (Final Report: 
Information Sharing Environment Suspicious Activity Reporting Evaluation 
Environment, 2010, p. 13). A Concept of Operations document outlines 
sponsorship and funding of the ISE, which is administered through the Office of 
the Program Manager of the Information Sharing Environment, established under 
IRTPA. This environment is designed as a "low risk approach for testing and 
evaluating ISE policies, business processes, capabilities, architectures, and 
standards by sponsoring efforts that implement and evaluate solutions to 
operational needs in a relatively controlled environment" (Nationwide Suspicious 
Activity Reporting Initiative Concept of Operations, 2008, sec. 5.1). By definition, 
this document embraces the components and framework of the ISE and does not 
consider the possibility that the foundation itself might be built upon incorrect 
assumptions. What if the entire concept of operations itself is flawed?  
In Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 
Report Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, Jerome P. Bjelopera of 
the Congressional Research Service provides additional background on the 
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intent in a report to Congress, in which he describes how the process is designed 
to work. Another report to Congress, this time from the Program Manager of the 
Information Sharing Environment, the Information Sharing Environment Annual 
Report to Congress (most recently from 2011) provides a good general 
background on the ISE and its state of readiness, at least as of the latest report 
in 2011. The report describes the purpose of the platform, to provide the “right 
information to the right people in time to prevent terrorist attacks” by providing 
access to the necessary information from the multiple and often disparate 
systems at the local, federal, and state levels (Paul, 2010, p. 36).  
Mark Lowenthal’s work on the intelligence community is widely respected 
and frames a central expert narrative. His work makes it easier to understand 
how the SAR process should work in the context of the intelligence cycle: (1) 
requirements, (2) collection, (3) processing and exploitation, (4) analysis and 
production, (5) dissemination, (6) consumption, and (7) feedback (Lowenthal, 
2009, p. 66). According to Lowenthal, the initial process challenge is in the 
collection phase, in which a lack of control and consistency exists in the quality 
and type of information being collected and submitted into the environment.  
Little research is available on how the SAR program has worked so far, 
with the exception of information published by the FBI. In 2009–2010, the FBI 
reported that 3,400 SAR submissions were entered into the system (FBI, 2008), 
with only 56 of them (2%) meriting an investigation (Straw, 2010). Additional 
literature review is necessary in this area. In 2011, the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police (IACP) conducted a meeting of local, state, and federal 
partner agencies to support a unified strategy in support of the SAR initiative. 
This strategy focuses on increasing public awareness of SAR reporting to law 
enforcement, SAR report generation by law enforcement, analysis by fusion 
centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and appropriate investigations. The 
strategy also includes emphasizing training for frontline officer training on the 
need to identify and report indicators of suspicious activity (Nationwide SAR 
Initiative, n.d.a.). An Activity Overview describing the Department of Homeland 
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Security/Department of Justice Technical Assistance Program for fusion centers 
places a heavy emphasis on training and enhancing critical thinking skills 
(DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and Services Activity 
Overview, 2012). The 2011 Nationwide SAR Initiative Annual Report suggests an 
increase in the number of SAR submissions compared to previous years; over 
17,000 as of March 2011, which supported 43,000 inquiries using a relatively 
simple search tool that supports user-generated inquiries as part of the 
environment (Nationwide SAR Initiative, n.d.b.). However, this report is silent on 
the number of investigations initiated because of these 17,000 submissions and 
does not make qualitative conclusions about their value, aside from reporting 
some anecdotal success stories.  
James E. Steiner retired after 36 years with the Central Intelligence 
Agency. He worked in the area of national intelligence, and now teaches at the 
State University of New York at Albany. In an article in the Homeland Security 
Affairs Journal, he argues that for a SAR submission to be useful in an “indirect” 
way, the system must have access to large amounts of information to identify 
unusual occurrences in baseline activity (Steiner, 2010). This argument supports 
Lowenthal’s notion that important information is often buried within a large 
amount of noise (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 72).  
Lowenthal provides background on the intelligence process. According to 
his work, at the stage of initial collection, information is not yet intelligence. 
Rather, it is a component of the collection phase that is then analyzed and results 
in intelligence. Nestor Duarte, an intelligence professional from the FBI and 
graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, provides research insights into the 
foundation of prevention and the requirement to collect a wide range of 
information concerning people who have not yet committed terrorist acts, in a 
well-researched thesis (Duarte, 2007, p. 17). 
Part of the problem is that the ISE does not allow the full range of 
information to be assessed. The notion of Persistent Surveillance as it exists in 
the military world is discussed by Lieutenant General and Deputy Chief of Staff of 
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the United States Army John Kimmons in a journal article describing the 
integration of indicators from a wide range of sensors and systems (Kimmons, 
2008) and Major David W. Pendall (also of the U.S. Army) in another article 
presenting a description of this continuous collection and assessment process.  
The failures of human decision making, or human frailty, is also explored. 
Significant challenges occur when relying upon this human process to make the 
correct determination that a piece of information should be shared. In the 2008 
Mumbai attacks, fishermen reported the arrival of the terrorists to local police, 
who did not act upon or share the information. According to reports cited in a 
RAND publication, the CIA and FBI did not share information that Khalid al-
Midhar and Nawqa Alhazmi, two men with connections to terrorism, had entered 
the United States prior to 9/11 (Hollywood & Pope, 2009, p. 5). Perhaps, this lack 
of sharing information occurred because, at the time the information became 
available, its significance was not known. 
In an article entitled, “Suspicious Activity Reports: Shifting the Analytical 
Paradigm,” Rafael Brinner (a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Liaison 
Officer to the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center) discusses the risk 
of placing too much emphasis on SARs in the absence of better threat 
intelligence. The article also describes SARs as anecdotal information that the 
reporter deemed suspicious “on some level” (Brinner, 2011, p. 2), which is 
consistent with the notion that the ISE places too much reliance on SARs from 
which to connect the dots, and thus, these subjective reports receive artificially 
high levels of attention.  
Researcher Gustavo Diaz, a fellow at the University of Madrid, presents a 
discussion paper in which he describes Michael Handel as a student of 
intelligence failure, who feels that the principal cause of such failure is the 
“limitations of human nature,” and most failures occur because decision makers 
fail to adapt their concepts to new information (Diaz, 2005). This human 
dependency must be removed. This review is expanded to explore more fully the 
notion of human failure, both in the intelligence space and in larger related 
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endeavors. Susan G. Hutchins (of the Naval Postgraduate School), Peter L. 
Pirolli, and Stuart K. Card (both of the Palo Alto Research Center) authored the 
chapter, “What Makes Intelligence Analysis Difficult?: A Cognitive Task Analysis” 
in Expertise Out of Context: Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on 
Naturalistic Decision Making. In this chapter, they highlight the problems faced by 
intelligence analysts, who must sort through “enormous volumes of data” to 
combine seemingly unrelated events to develop intelligence, often under periods 
of intense pressure and time constraints (Hoffman, 2007, pp. 281–282).  
Dr. Fathali Moghaddam describes the notion that humans are predisposed 
to certain ways of viewing the world, and these “constructs” impact the way 
information streams are processed (Moghaddam, 2001, pp. 29–31). In What 
Makes Intelligence Analysis Difficult?: A Cognitive Task Analysis, the authors 
conducted a study of the cognitive challenges associated with intelligence 
analysis, and identify a number that falls within the scope of human frailty 
(Hutchins, Pirollo, & Card, 2007, pp. 298–304). In Black Swan, Taleb discusses 
the “highly improbable consequential event” (Taleb, 2007, p. 18), and the 
difficulty humans have in identifying something that they do not expect to 
happen. Dan Ariely, the noted Israeli professor of psychology and behavioral 
economics, challenges the entire concept of human rationality in a compelling 
Ted Talk in which he discusses that sometimes when faced with too much 
complexity, humans simply do not do anything (Ariely, 2008).  
An optimistic report entitled “Vision 2015: A Globally Networked and 
Integrated Intelligence Enterprise” describes a vision for what the ISE needs to 
become—that it should more closely align with the concept of persistent 
surveillance by removing the restrictions on information entry and adding 
appropriate technologies and capabilities to the environment to improve its 
potential effectiveness. The current ISE, by definition, requires that the evaluator 
determine the potential criticality of a piece of information within the framework of 
that person’s current understanding of the threat environment, which does not 
contemplate “weak signals” and indicators of new and emerging threats that will 
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require an ability to assess global risks and the use of a more interactive model 
that blurs the distinction between the information producer and the information 
user, as described in a “best case” visioning document from the Director of 
National Intelligence published in 2008 and still operative, which describes a 
vision for the year 2015. This vision will not be realized if the arguments in this 
literature review and subsequent thesis are correct (Vision 2015: A Globally 
Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise, 2008, p. 9). 
The use of business intelligence in the commercial arena, including 
prediction and analytics, in risk modeling (Bamberger, 2010), fraud detection 
(Malphrus, 2009), medical diagnostics (Wernick et al., 2010, pp. 25–38), sales 
and operations planning (Lapide, 2004), banking (Graves, 2011), and other fields 
is well documented. One directly relevant process is suspicious activity reports in 
the banking sector, in which machine models detect unknown patterns for 
fraudulent use of credit cards using real-time data for assessment (Widder et al., 
2007).  
Less literature is available in the role of data mining for counterterrorism, 
primarily because this segment is less mature than private sector uses of this 
capability. The Cato Institute concluded that data mining is not ideally suited to 
this problem (Jonas & Harper, 2006). Other work by Colonel Brett Weigle of the 
U.S. Army War College explores the possibility of using “prediction markets” to 
aggregate information from disparate sources to develop possible leading 
indicators towards future terrorist events (Weigle, 2007). Three years before 
9/11, the CIA described data mining as “vital” to support the intelligence 
community’s ability to identify future threats as outlined in a Jane’s Defense 
Weekly journal article (Starr, 1998). An excellent summary document from the 
Congressional Research Service by the technology analyst Jeffrey Seifert 
outlines the role of data mining in homeland security, which describes some of its 
current uses in the anti-terrorism arena, as well as challenges in data quality and 
interoperability (Seifert, 2007). 
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An emerging area of Predictive Policing involves “…taking data from 
disparate sources” and using analysis techniques to predict and respond to 
outcomes based upon this data, as published by the National Institute of Justice 
(Pearsall, 2010). Chicago is one of a handful of U.S. cities to receive the second 
phase of a National Institute of Justice Predictive Policing grant, and initial and 
secondary grant application materials, along with anticipated early project results 
from the second phase of this project, is used to inform the development of this 
thesis (Chicago Using Predictive Analytics to Fight Crime, 2010). Some best 
practices in the use of law enforcement technology include Chicago’s fusion 
center (the Crime Prevention and Information Center, or CPIC), which is 
described in various reports (Harris, 2008), and Chicago’s early and current use 
of technology (Technology Update, 2007), beginning with an automated crime 
mapping platform developed in the early 1990s as documented in a National 
Institute of Justice Report (Rich, 1996).  
A great wealth of industry reports exist from commercial research 
providers, such as Forrester, in which senior analyst James Kobielus conducted 
an evaluation of vendor-specific solutions and assessed trends in this space 
(Kobielus, 2010). Numerous workshop proceedings, presentation summaries, 
and industry reports provide an overview of best practices in the use of 
information indicators to make predictions.  
A breadth of information on the reference models is discussed in Chapter 
IV, including the Police National Database that was mandated as a result of a 
non-terrorism related murder of two schoolgirls as described in report that 
acknowledged the failure of police systems to share information across 
jurisdictional boundaries (IMPACT Programme: Police National Database Privacy 
Impact Assessment Report, 2009, p. 6). Bruce Berkowitz describes the use of 
technology in facilitating the military’s use of Persistent Surveillance. The FinCEN 
is well described in various official publications, and a wide range of performance 
data exists on the system (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Annual Report 
2011, 2011).  
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Big Data describes the exponential growth and availability of vast 
quantities of information, and a variety of industry research publications and the 
White House itself identify its potential to lead to innovation within organizations 
(Big Data, 2012). In March 2012, the White House announced a $200 million 
funding initiative designed to improve “…our ability to extract knowledge and 
insights from large and complex collections of digital data… to help solve some 
of our Nation’s most pressing problems” (Executive Office of the President, 
2012). This effort announced a series of grants to various agencies, ranging from 
the National Science Foundation to the Department of Energy to the Department 
of Defense: but no Department of Homeland Security nor Department of Justice 
projects were identified, unfortunately. When examining Big Data and Business 
Intelligence (which is critical to “connect the dots” if they are available in the 
assessment environment to connect), a wide range of models and descriptions of 
required characteristics for success is necessary, such as Eckerson’s Spectrum 
of BI Technologies (Eckerson, 2012, p. 5) that presents a Value and Complexity 
Scale for scoring the maturity of various intelligence capabilities (as one might 
expect, the ISE scores very poorly on this scale). A journal article by Calvert 
Jones discusses the need to provide access to information from as many 
sources as possible (Jones, 2007, p. 385) and to have comprehensive data to 
avoid being caught off guard (Jones, 2007, p. 387). In a report on how to plan for 
Big Data (entitled, not surprisingly, “Planning for Big Data”), the components 
necessary for success are defined (Volume, Velocity, Varity) (Dumbill, 2012, p. 
37).  
Dr. Erik Dahl discusses a comprehensive analysis of 176 terrorist plots 
against the United States that have been thwarted, , with Human Intelligence 
identified as being utilized to stop 60% of these attacks (Dahl, 2011, p. 628). This 
assessment may seem counter to the narrative presented in this thesis, except 
for two things. First, 40% of the attacks were stopped using other mechanisms, 
such as signals intelligence, other law enforcement activity, public threats, and 
other means.  Second, since no effective platform comprises all available 
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information from all sources that might allow for the concept of Big Data to work, 
it is impossible to determine whether or not such a model and the use of 
analytics across available data elements and used by fusion centers (if the data 
and tools had been available for use) might also have identified and thwarted 
these same attacks, perhaps even sooner, and perhaps, even more attacks 
might have been uncovered.  
In Terror and Consent, Philip Bobbitt provides material that has relevance 
for this thesis, which includes discussions on the use of state power to ensure 
freedom and the notion that increases in such power does not necessarily equate 
to a diminishment of liberty, and in fact, may be necessary to ensure that it 
survives. He also describes a failed attempt at creating an analytics platform to 
identify pre-terrorist activities using data mining presented as exactly the wrong 
approach to take in the recommendations chapter of this thesis (Bobbitt, 2008). 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a literature review and described publications 
describing the ISE and providing a basis for its development. Little published 
information on the performance of the platform is available to date, although an 
increase in submission volume over the years occurs, although little assessment 
appears on the outcomes of these submissions (for example, how many may 
have resulted in referrals to other investigative agencies or to follow-up 
investigations being conducted). Publications describe the need for the program 
to have access to large amounts of information to establish unusual occurrences 
outside of the expected baseline of activity. In other words, it is hard to determine 
what is unusual if adequate indicators are not available to determine what is 
usual. The military's concept of persistent surveillance is reported, in which a 
variety of information is available to form a complete operational picture. Human 
frailty and its role in intelligence failure are highlighted in several publications. 
People just are not good at seeing things they do not expect to see, and are  
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predisposed to view the world with a distinct set of biases. The use of business 
intelligence and Big Data across numerous sectors is described. Reference 
models for comparison are outlined. 
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IV.  REFERENCE MODELS FOR INFORMATION SHARING 
This section focuses on what is possible with complete information. It 
explores the use of predictive analytics in numerous applications, including both 
the private and public sectors. This issue is important to investigate because it is 
central to providing a complete operating picture from which to perform proactive 
analytics activities to identify and prevent pre-terrorist incident indicators before 
they escalate to terrorism. The literature on the application of predictive analytics 
traces back to at least 1947 in the book Cycles: The Science of Prediction that 
describes the use of prediction in chemistry, nuclear physics, and economics 
(Dewey & Dakin, 1947, p. vii). A model utilized in the United Kingdom, the Police 
National Database (PND), is explored.  
A.  PRACTICAL MODELS 
1. United Kingdom 
The British intelligence system consists of three agencies: MI5/ Security 
Service for domestic activities and threats and national security (reporting to the 
Home Secretary), MI6/ Secret Intelligence Service for foreign activities and 
threats, and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) for signals 
intelligence, which is discussed in more detail shortly (both of these reporting to 
the Foreign Secretary). In addition, every police department in Britain has a 
dedicated unit known as Special Branch, which consists of specially trained 
officers directed by MI5 to gather information related to potential domestic 
terrorist activities (Burke, 2009, p. 35). In addition to specially-trained officers 
directly assigned to each police agency in Britain, every police department is able 
to communicate with MI5 utilizing a computer network, and a national platform 
known as the IMPACT Programme, similar to the Suspicious Activity Reporting 
process in the United States, facilitates information-sharing (Burke, 2009, p. 37).  
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IMPACT was initiated as a result of a non terrorism-related murder of two 
schoolgirls and the acknowledgement that a cross-jurisdictional investigation was 
hampered by an inability to exchange information effectively between the 
Cambridge and Humberside police departments that allowed the offender to get 
close to the children despite numerous prior sex crimes, as identified in a report 
by Sir Michael Bichard.. Published in 2004 and commissioned by the (then) 
Home Secretary, this report acknowledged that national information systems 
were accessible to all police departments, but concluded that no “firm plans” 
existed for the creation of a national, interoperable, intelligence-sharing system 
(or shared “IT system,” as the report calls it), and thus, prompted the 
development of such a system that is now part of the National Policing 
Improvement Agency (NPIA), launched in 2007 as part of the Home Office 
(IMPACT Programme: Police National Database—Privacy Impact Assessment 
Report, 2009, p. 6). 
Although not yet complete, this system is a more comprehensive 
approach to facilitating information sharing across British police agencies. It 
consists of three key deliverables. 
 IMPACT Nominal Index (INI), a reference system that allows 
agencies to identify which force is holding information related to an 
individual (delivered in 2005 and replaced by the Police National 
Database in 2011). 
 Management of Police Information, a comprehensive guidance to 
ensure that information is relevant, accessible, and professionally 
managed (all forces were compliant by 2010). 
 Police National Database, a single source of police information 
consisting of records from individual agency intelligence, crime, 
domestic abuse, child abuse, and custody business areas 
(operational in summer, 2011), allowing specially-trained and vetted 
users to identify “links and patterns” occurring at the local, regional, 
and national levels (Police National Database).  
Despite the development of comprehensive guidelines for appropriate use, the 
system has faced criticism and raised privacy concerns. A Daily Mail article 
reports that one in four Britons will be recorded in the Police National Database, 
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which will be loaded with 15 million records of suspects, some victims, and 
criminals. The article quotes Daniel Hamilton, of Big Brother Watch: “It’s 
staggering to think that a quarter of the British population could be logged...” on 
the database (Greenwood, 2011). 
The Police National Database is consistent with the need to have a 
complete operating picture from which to connect the dots. The system is 
specifically designed to overcome one of the inherent weaknesses of the U.S. 
SAR program: that an analyst must identify a possible nexus to terrorism for a 
discreet component of information before it is even flagged for potential sharing. 
A publication of the NPIA describes it this way, “Sometimes connections [across 
incidents] can be very weak, and [under the old system] we had to rely on other 
forces putting their markers on intelligence” (The PND: Making a Difference, 
2010). Thus, the IMPACT Police National Database is specifically designed to 
overcome this inherent weakness of the U.S. SAR program. 
2. Military Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) 
Consistent with the notion of a broad, unfiltered first-stage collection of 
information for analysis is the concept of Persistent Surveillance, a term used 
primarily in a military intelligence/ISR context and which refers to the integration 
of data largely from sensors and systems, such as satellites and motion 
detectors to allow analysts to “rapidly search, correlate, fuse and visualize” 
across large datasets (Kimmons, 2008). This concept is exactly what a fusion 
center should be doing, and is consistent with the concept of operations 
described in earlier sections (United States, 2005, p. 11), except that the fusion 
center depends upon the ISE that limits this breadth of information. To continue 





 Multimode, multidimensional and continuous collection across the 
entire operational environment. 
 Near real-time data distribution with user-defined presentation 
formats (delivery). 
 Horizontal integration of data and advanced, distributed analytics. 
Although used in the military space, this term can also be used to inform the 
needs of the ISE. In fact, one could argue that Persistent Surveillance is almost 
fundamentally at odds with the current process that restricts information into the 
ISE. Instead of persistent surveillance, in which a broad base of unfiltered real-
time information is immediately available to analysts and delivered to users, the 
SAR process requires that first responders (collectors) individually assess each 
potential component of information, before it can even be considered for analysis 
at the fusion center level.  
Information that enters the fusion environment generally comes from the 
following sources (Berkowitz, 2008).  
 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), which often includes intercepts of 
electronic communication. 
 Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), which includes satellite imagery, 
pictures, sensors, and video.  
 Measurement and Signals Intelligence (MASINT), which includes 
nuclear, acoustic, seismic, or spectral information. 
 Human Intelligence (HUMINT), which comes from human beings; 
e.g., collectors and operative agents.  
 Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), from public websites, media 
sources, and other unclassified events and reports.  
Although some of these sources do not have a direct application to law 
enforcement data sources that are the suppliers to the ISE, most do. For 
example, GEOINT can be police surveillance camera imagery. MASINT can be 
gunshot detectors or Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Nuclear (CBRN) sensors. 
HUMINT would be the primary information sources from a police agency: 911 
calls, incident reports, arrest reports, suspicious activity reports, gang incident 
data, curfew violation reports, vehicle crash reports, and others.  
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This Persistent Surveillance concept is designed to address this key 
failure of the intelligence and law enforcement communities to integrate their 
available information, the “dots,” if you will; to allow for their analysis, or 
“connection,” thus the “connect the dots” metaphor. For this concept to be 
realized, the dots must be available. This “failure to disseminate… threat 
information” and lack of information-sharing between law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies and “ambiguity inherent in attempting to assess hostile 
intent [emphasis added]” were factors in missed opportunity to prevent the 
attacks of 9/11” (Ang & Luikart, 2003, p. 69). This concept is nothing new. 
Failures of intelligence occurred prior to 9/11 as well. 
3. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
Interestingly, a very similar information-sharing environment is focused on 
protecting the financial system from crime that has been in place for more than 
20 years. Known as FinCEN, the FinCEN overcomes many of the fundamental 
problems with the ISE, and even utilizes its own version of the Suspicious Activity 
Report—also known by the same name as the ISE SAR, and designed to identify 
potential illegal activity. FinCEN receives vast amounts of financial transaction 
information, assesses these indicators for possible abnormal activity, shares 
information with international organizations, and disseminates data for law 
enforcement purposes (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Annual Report 
2011, 2011, p. 1). FinCEN receives the bulk of its information from two 
mandatory sources, Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs), which must be filed 
by financial institutions when transactions exceed $10,000.00 in value (either 
individually or in aggregate in the case of multiple transactions on behalf of the 
same person), and Suspicious Activity Reports when financial institutions “know, 
suspect, or have reason to suspect” illegal activity. These reports are mandatory, 
and all financial institutions must comply, with 14,826,316 Currency Transaction 
Reports filed, 1,446,273 SAR filings, and various additional reports and  
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submissions to the network; for a grand total of 17,124,020 total submissions in 
2011 (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Annual Report 2011, 2011, pp. 7–
8). 
Detailed reports of the number of reports are submitted to FinCEN, but 
little recent information on how many resulted in a follow-up investigation. In the 
6-½ year period ending October 31, 2002, 940,000 financial SARs were 
generated in the United States, which resulted in 70,000 direct referrals to law 
enforcement agencies, although no specific information is available on how many 
of these actually generated investigations (Reuter & Truman, 2004, p. 107). This 
number is a 7.44% referral rate, if presuming that most of these resulted in some 
kind of follow-up investigation (a reasonable presumption since FinCEN 
reviewers found some reasonable basis for referring them to law enforcement in 
the first place), or more than three times the rate for ISE SAR investigative action 
(which was 2% in 2009–2010, from Section II-B of this thesis).  
Similar financial crime reporting platforms exist in other nations. FinCEN is 
the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIN) for the United States. More than 100 nations 
participate in the Egmont Group, which derives its name from a 1995 meeting 
conducted at the Egmont Arenberg Palace in Brussels during which participants 
recognized the benefits of creating a network of international financial crime 
detection and reporting, and as such, standards were defined for participation 
(The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, n.d.). The United Kingdom is 
another participant in this group, whose Serious Organized Crime Agency 
(SOCA) is responsible for the collection and analysis of financial SARs in the 
country. Consistent with the completeness of the Police National Database, 
SOCA provides a more robust platform for information assessment than its U.S. 
counterpart, in which up to 30% of SARs in the United Kingdom “either led to a 
longer term investigation, or added substantially to an existing investigation” as 
reported in 2011 (The Impact of SARs in Reducing Crime, n.d.). This number is 
more than three times the number of follow-up referrals for the U.S. program and 
15 times the number of follow-up referrals for the ISE SAR program (although 
 33
each measure is for a different performance period and reflects a different level 
of maturity for the various platforms, with ISE SAR probably the least mature if 
the referral metric discussed in this thesis is an accurate measure).  
B.  METRICS FOR SUCCESS 
According to research by a leading business intelligence think shop, the 
top two leading survey responses from over 100 users who have implemented 
data analytics this technology across their business enterprise, include 1) 
meeting business goals and 2) model accuracy (Eckerson, 2007, p. 9). If these 
metrics are applied to the ISE, they might reasonably be expected to translate 
into allowing the environment to meet its objectives of facilitating the sharing of 
terrorism-related information better and for allowing this information to be used 
for the prevention of terrorist acts. If a goal of applying analytics to the ISE were 
to identify actionable intelligence from the data, metrics for success would 
reasonably include such elements as the following. 
 The number of criminal terrorist investigations initiated. 
 The number of criminal terrorists identified. 
 The number of criminal terrorists arrested. 
 The number of criminal terrorist cells identified. 
 The number of connections across criminal terrorist organizations 
determined.  
 The number of criminal terrorist plots identified. 
 The number of criminal terrorist actions prevented. 
 The number of inquiries and analysis activities performed by users 
of the environment. 
 Self-surveys of perceived value and usefulness across users of the 
environment. 
C. DESIRED OUTCOMES 
The desired outcome of any effective model is the successful realization of 
its stated objectives. In the case of the ISE, the objective is, according to the 9/11 
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Commission Report and its recommendations, to connect the dots across data 
sources so that the events of 9/11 do not occur again and the next potential 
terrorist attack is identified and prevented before it occurs. 
D. KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE MODELS 
The examples of effective models described above share similar 
characteristics. 
 Complete, comprehensive, persistent, real-time information from 
multi-mode sources. 
 Analytical tools to identify relationships across data elements. 
 Consistent training across jurisdictional lines. 
 Horizontal, integrated data sharing. 
 Lack of dependency upon human element vetting discrete 
components of information before they can be shared. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter identified the art of the possible by describing several 
reference models for comparison, including the Police National Database in the 
United Kingdom, the military's concept of persistent surveillance, and the 
FinCEN. All of these systems "get it right," or at least get it better than the ISE. 
Metrics for success for the ISE were explored, and included such measurement 
areas as the number of terrorist investigations initiated and the number of 
terrorists arrested. Key characteristics of the effective models described here are 
outlined. These models all have access to a greater range of information from 
multiple sources, analytical tools, consistent training, horizontal integrated data 
sharing, and a lack of dependency on single points of human frailty. 
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V. COMPARE AND CONTRAST 
A. INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT COMPARISON 
Eckerson describes maturity levels of Business Intelligence platforms as 
shown in Figure 3 (Eckerson, 2007, p. 5). 
 
 
Figure 3.   Spectrum of Business Intelligence 
In this spectrum, the ISE is at the low end of both the Business Value and 
Complexity scales. It tracks what happened, and provides basic query, reporting, 
and search tools based upon the data it collects. It actually does a poor job at 
even this lowest-level task since, as discussed earlier, it does not even do a 
comprehensive job of collecting enough data elements to form a comprehensive 
picture of what has happened.  
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1. Limited Data 
In the journal article entitled “Intelligence Reform: The Logic of Information 
Sharing,” Calvert Jones makes some relevant points. Information needs to be as 
sharable as possible and integrated from as many sources as possible (Jones, 
2007, p. 385). Vast amounts of data are required to prevent “being caught off 
guard” by unexpected happenings (Jones, 2007, p. 387). As a basic framework 
for understanding activity, information is necessary to form a baseline of 
expected activity, so that unexpected activity can be detected. However, the ISE 
relies on a “conduit” metaphor for information sharing; ideas must be physically 
transferred from one person to another through a conduit (Jones, 2007, p. 389). 
In the case of the ISE, this metaphor means that the sender is the person 
completing a SAR, and the listener is the person analyzing it for potential 
actionable intelligence (of course, additional approval stages exist that could also 
be considered “listening” activities). Jones suggests that this process can quickly 
overwhelm the listener, which causes a loss of context and confusion from 
“information overload,” and that technology and analytics are needed to make 
sense of this information (Jones, 2007, pp. 396–398). This analytics component 
is missing from the ISE, and if it were present, it would not have access to the 
range of information Jones describes as necessary to detect unexpected 
behavior. 
As noted earlier, the 2011 ISE Annual Report to the Congress presents a 
broad definition of the ISE itself as “infrastructure and capabilities,” which 
extends the parameters of the environment and includes many capabilities that 
are not directly accessible from the ISE assessment space—a notion that is 
reinforced by several examples given of potential use cases, one of which 
involves a police officer using the NCIC, a national computer database of criminal 
justice information including wanted persons and criminal histories (Aftergood, 
,2008), to conduct a query, the results of which direct the officer to contact the 
Terrorist Screening Center, a terrorist watch list containing information on known 
or suspected terrorists (Terrorist Screening Center, n.d.), to assess a potential 
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match. Another example depicts an intelligence analyst utilizing the Library of 
National Intelligence, a centralized automated “card catalog” containing a 
summary of all disseminated intelligence products maintained by the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence and the CIA (Library of National Intelligence, 
n.d.) to develop new intelligence products (ISE Annual Report to the Congress, 
2011, p. 3). Not all these systems are part of an integrated, searchable database, 
as the first example notes, an officer has to utilize one system (NCIC) and then is 
referred to another. Using this definition of a system, just about any anti-terrorist 
activity conducted by any local, state, or federal official accessing any system 
would fall within the parameters of the ISE, whether or not the system utilized is 
actually integrated with the ISE and available for data analytics and inquiries from 
this environment (i.e., without having to leave one system and access another).  
2. Unlimited Data 
At the other end of the scales of value and complexity exists the Predictive 
Policing framework, using the Chicago model as an example, in which 
information is collected and reported upon. On Line Analytics Processing (OLAP) 
and visualization tools, such as maps, allow users to ask and receive answers to 
questions of why things are happening, real-time dashboards allow users to ask 
what is happening now, and the prediction capability in development allows for 
projections about what might be likely to happen in the future. OLAP is a “multi-
dimensional view of aggregate data” that allows advanced analytics to occur, and 
can be accessed by users throughout the Chicago Police Department on 
networked desktop and mobile computers to provide “one stop shopping” 
accessibility and analysis activities (Forsman, 1997). The Chicago model creates 
a single, integrated assessment space in which all available variables—the more 
the better, since any combination of obscure indicators could point to an 
emerging problem, trend, or pattern, or could form a prediction space—are 
available for analysis.  
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Big Data is a concept that involves the ability to process massive amounts 
of information at scales not possible with traditional computing techniques. It 
generally involves three components. 
 Volume, or having access to extremely large sets of information. As 
this source suggests, if a forecasting model that considers 300 
factors rather than six could be developed, a more accurate 
prediction could probably be generated. 
 Velocity, or the rate at which data flows into a processing 
environment. In the retail space, this component could be access to 
real-time customer sales data that provides competitive advantage 
to those retailers who can assess it instantly and make projections 
about customer behavior. This term refers to the ability to process 
large streams of real-time information quickly. 
 Variety, or the diverse nature of information from a wide range of 
sources that might not fall within defined structures. Examples 
include text from social networks, sensor data, image detection, 
and other semi-structured and unstructured information (Dumbill, 
2012, p. 37). 
The concept of Big Data requires that the manner in the value of 
information is though about, must change. Rather than a single piece of 
information being individually assessed for its potential value and being utilized 
only if it is relevant, Big Data takes the opposite view. With the amount of 
information potentially relevant for pattern identification, forecasting, and other 
analytics activities, it is not practical to assess individual components. Instead, 
each piece of information by itself may have low value, but the “potential for 
insight is great” if everything can be analyzed (Zikopoulos, 2012, p. 11). The 
current ISE SAR process is everything that Big Data is not. It fails to consider the 
potential value of a single piece of information in the larger context and only 
assigns value to that piece of information itself, rather than considering the value 
of larger sets of data that might form a more accurate assessment environment. 
When looking at volume, for example, only specific SAR submissions that have 
been manually identified, generated, submitted, approved, and shared will ever 
form the basis for future assessment. When examining velocity, a SAR must be  
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created by a human being after that human being becomes aware of an event 
that this person believes has a nexus to terrorism. Finally, when examining 
variety, the primary information type assessed in the ISE is a SAR. 
B. DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES 
One useful reference model to compare and contrast with the ISE is the 
United Kingdom’s PND or Police National Computer (PNC) as it is sometimes 
called since its objectives, users, data sources, and national cross-jurisdictional 
scope are most aligned. The PND is accessible by both MI5 and MI6, in addition 
to the police services (The Police National Computer (PNC), n.d.). Therefore, it is 
useful to provide a matrix comparing the two approaches, which is referred to in 
Table 1 as the U.S. approach and the U.K. approach.  
 
Challenge U.S. Approach U.K. Approach Comment 
Lack of actionable 
intelligence means 
there is a lack of 




discrete pieces of 
information into a 
shared environment 
Police National Database 
(PND) provides 
comprehensive, “all source” 
information to ensure all the 
dots are available, not only 
those that have been vetted 
U.K. approach provides 
complete operating picture 
from which to draw 
connections, U.S. 
approach does not  
Lack of ability to 
identify and assess 
pre-terrorist incident 
indicator information 
means dots cannot 
be connected 
Fusion centers with 
varying protocols 
generally operated by 
states assess 
information, federal 
fusion centers assess 
available information  
Trained Intelligence 
analysts embedded at each 
police agency and at the 
national level and reporting 
to the Home Office can 
assess all information from 
the PND 
U.K. approach provides 
consistency and standards 
in training for intel analysts 
at each agency, U.S. 
approach is characterized 
by a lack of standards and 
no centralized oversight 
Human Dependency Agency analysts must 
decide that information 
rises to the level of 
nexus to terrorism 
before it can be shared 
with anyone in the ISE 
The PND shares all 
information, without a “pre-
vetting” process 
The U.K. approach 
removes one of the barriers 
for information availability 
and thus eliminates a 
critical human dependency 
from the process 




A second useful comparison is FinCEN, the financial network, which uses 
SAR reports as the ISE does, but also uses additional indicators, which in this 
example, are compared in the context of the components of Big Data described 
earlier.  
 
Component ISE SAR FinCEN Comment 
Volume Suspicious Activity 
Reports prepared 
manually by human 
analyst. 3,400 reports 




Report, various other 
reports generated 





FinCEN has appropriate 
volume to provide enough 
information to identify 
patterns, trends, and activities 
outside the baseline.  
ISE SAR relies on the 
traditional model of reviewing 
a single indicator for potential 
value without any contextual 
assessment.  
Velocity Suspicious Activity 
Reports generated after 
the fact, if a human being 
determines the need; 
and submitted only after 
preparation, approval, 
vetting, and submission 
to the Information 
Sharing Environment. 
Voluntary compliance 
with no penalties for 







certain criteria are 
met. Suspicious 
Activity Reports 
required to be 
generated when 
suspicious activity is 
identified. Mandatory 
compliance with 
penalties for failure 
to submit.  
FinCEN has appropriate 
velocity to allow for detection 
of activity in near real-time.  
ISE SAR relies on a slow 
manual process as far from 
real-time as one can imagine. 
Variety Indicators are limited to a 
single component, the 
SAR.  
Indicators include 
SARs and a variety 
of other sources 
including Currency 
Transaction Reports 
and reports of cash 
payments over 
$10,000, registration 
of money services 
businesses, reports 
of foreign bank 
accounts, and 
others. 
FinCEN provides access to a 
variety of indicator data 
sources. 
ISE provides access to a 
single data source, the SAR.  
Table 2.   ISE/SAR vs. FinCEN 
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Both the PND and the FinCEN utilize approaches designed to increase volume, 
velocity, and variety of information available for analysis to identify potential 
indicators of criminal activity. Both these platforms reduce the role that human 
decision making plays in determining whether or not data enter the assessment 
environment by allowing complete situational awareness indicators to enter their 
respective evaluation spaces, and thus, reduce one potential point of failure and 
enhance the effectiveness of these platforms.  
C. WEAKNESSES OF CURRENT MODEL 
This section describes weaknesses of the ISE in the context of the 
reference models described earlier. When discussing weaknesses, it is useful to 
note that the working definition of the ISE used for comparison purposes in this 
thesis is not the definition included in the ISE Annual Report to the Congress, in 
which almost any system or database could be described as part of the ISE. 
Rather, it is the integrated, accessible, searchable platform for inquiry and 
analysis that forms the actual ISE data components, primarily SAR reports. 
1.  Lack of Information 
Big Data relies upon vast quantities of information to detect patterns and 
trends and to support analytics activities. A lack of information limits the 
effectiveness of these assessment activities. In other words, the less dots that 
available, the less ways they can be analyzed for possible connection. In an 
analysis of terrorist plots identified from 1999 to 2009 published by the Institute 
for Homeland Security Solutions, 86 foiled or executed attacks against U.S. 
targets were evaluated using open-source intelligence. The ISE, through SAR 
reports, only indirectly allows for a large majority of clues from law enforcement 
agencies and the public. This analysis indicated that law enforcement is the first 
line of defense in detecting these plots, with information related to over 80% of 
the plots coming from criminal justice agencies, and the intelligence community 
providing initial clues in only 19% of the cases. Nearly one in five plots were 
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identified and stopped “accidentally” while law enforcement was investigating 
seemingly unrelated crimes (Strom et al., 2010, p. 19). This analysis is important, 
because the emphasis of the ISE is on the more traditionally defined 
“intelligence” information or that with an identifiable nexus to terrorism, which 
must be vetted by trained analysts and approved by supervisors before it can be 
shared. Law enforcement investigations are recursive processes, which depend 
upon the availability of a wide range of information to find associations across 
people, events, and assets. Investigative techniques are more mature than 
finding (or, to put it another way, collecting and reporting) the initial clues 
(Hollywood & Pope, 2009, p. 5). 
a. Information Beyond SAR Submissions 
It is more likely that information related to a terrorist threat will be 
identified from law enforcement sources than from intelligence sources, and that 
evidence of such a threat will be found in the “incidental contact with… police 
officers” (Bjelopera, 2010, p. 5) than with federal agents. It is not too much of a 
stretch, then, to presume that such information might come from a source not 
traditionally allowed for in the SAR report or the ISE, such as a 911 call or other 
documentation of a routine law enforcement interaction with a subject. It is further 
possible that the records related to such documentation will not be pushed into 
any shared space for analysis or possible connection to other sources to allow 
for a determination that such activity has a possible nexus to terrorism, especially 
when evaluated in the context of events and activity documented in other 
jurisdictions from other sources. The question of what is shared needs to be 
eliminated as a point of failure. Everything needs to be shared and made 
available for analysis. The conclusion chapter provides some possibilities for 
achieving this vision, which will not be easy and is not a short-term fix.  
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b. Disrupting Terrorist Plots 
Dr. Erik Dahl has conducted an analysis of 176 terrorist plots 
against the United States over the last 25 years that have been thwarted, and 
describes the assessment dataset as the most comprehensive of its kind. 
According to this evaluation, most plots were not disrupted “when a highly skilled 
analyst detects subtle clues” that link disparate bits of data, but rather when 
intelligence and law enforcement entities identify detailed information relevant to 
specific plots, which is often developed by domestic agencies (Dahl, 2011, p. 
622). However, Dahl acknowledges that it is difficult to assess precisely how 
many attacks may have been prevented, specifically because it is difficult to 
measure events that do not occur, and terrorists themselves may flood systems 
with deceptive information that might indicate false plots (Dahl, 2011, pp. 622–
623). This assessment suggests that evaluating large volumes of information to 
“connect the dots” is not the solution to preventing terrorist attacks. In fact, 
externally thwarted domestic terrorism cases were thwarted based on the 
following information sources: human intelligence (60%), signals intelligence 
(10%), chance encounter (7%), other law enforcement activity (6%), overseas 
intelligence (6%), detainee interrogation (6%), and public threats (5%) (Dahl, 
2011, p. 628). 
Dahl’s assessment strengthens the need to remove barriers 
present in the ISE. It is difficult to conclude that assessing available data would 
not have prevented the referenced potential attacks, since no environment 
available presents all possible indicators of behavior. In other words, if a robust, 
data-rich environment, with a complete operational picture, had been present (in 
other words, if all the “dots” had been available), it is possible that the plots 
identified might have been found using other information elements assessed in 
other ways. Perhaps in at least some of these cases, other indicators of 
suspicious behavior might have been reflected by measures not in the current 
environment. In fact, it is possible that more plots might have been identified, that 
these plots might have been identified sooner, or that more connections across 
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potential terrorist activities might also have been uncovered. Even if the 
argument that a majority of plots are uncovered based on human intelligence is 
accepted, current barriers to the ISE SAR process unnecessarily restrict even 
this form of intelligence from entering the evaluation space. Also, —the remaining 
40% of non-human intelligence sources are potentially lacking from the 
evaluation environment altogether. Finally, as Dahl acknowledges, the universe 
of thwarted (or non-thwarted plots that might be in progress at this moment, for 
that matter) terrorist plots could be larger than 176, since it is impossible to 
assess all the plots that did not occur (i.e., proving a negative).  
c. Scope of Information  
A range of information collected at the law enforcement agency 
level does not meet the definition of nexus to terrorism by itself and does not 
have formal categorical descriptors in the SAR report, that together could have 
allowed these thwarted plots to be identified with methods other than (or 
enhanced by) human intelligence, which include such critical elements as 911 
calls for service and reports of theft and other seemingly unrelated (to terrorism) 
crimes. Take the example of a series of calls to 911 concerning suspicious 
persons taking photographs of bridges. If these calls occur over a period of time, 
without connections made between them, it is unlikely that a single call would 
result in any kind of police report (Hollywood & Pope, 2009, p. 5), much less a 
SAR report. This scenario becomes even more compelling if the events were 
occurring across local jurisdictional boundaries.  
The 2011 ISE Annual Report to Congress acknowledges the need 
for improved efforts to improve the scope of information available and to enhance 
analytics and aggregation capacity. It refers to the creation of a Multimodal 
Information Sharing Task Force (MIST) designed to foster information-sharing in 
a port environment, and to enhanced law enforcement information-sharing 
through N-Dex, the FBI’s voluntary national data exchange system for police 
incident reports that will be an important addition to the ISE. Working groups 
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were also established to discuss interoperability standards and improved data 
aggregation, and analytics capabilities, and to partner with the private sector and 
foreign partners to identify critical sources of knowledge (ISE Annual Report to 
the Congress, 2011, pp. xiii–xvi). These efforts are in the working group 
assessment process.  
2.  Human Dependency 
To share information with external agencies in the ISE platform, a law 
enforcement officer must determine that suspicious activity has been identified 
that might have a possible connection to terrorism. That information must then be 
submitted to the state or local fusion center, at which an intelligence analyst must 
review it to determine if it meets the criteria for sharing. Presuming the analyst 
makes the determination that the activity meets the criteria for submission; it is 
entered into the information-sharing environment and can then be accessed by 
human analysts for possible connection with other intelligence information 
(Bjelopera, 2010, p. 8). This information sharing presumes that both the law 
enforcement officer and the analyst have the foresight to determine that one 
piece of information, at the time it is identified and analyzed, might have a nexus 
to terrorism, or, to quote the National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism from the 
Bush Administration, that “…[i]nformation acquired for one purpose, or under one 
set of authorities, might provide unique insights when combined… with seemingly 
unrelated information from other sources” (NSIS—Introduction and Overview, 
n.d.). 
a. Unknown Significance 
Significant challenges arise when relying on this human process to 
make the correct determination that a piece of information should be shared. In 
the 2008 Mumbai attacks, fishermen reported the arrival of the terrorists to local 
police, who did not act upon or share the information. According to reports, the 
CIA and Federal FBI did not share information that Khalid al-Midhar and Nawqa 
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Alhazmi, two men with connections to terrorism, had entered the United States 
prior to 9/11 (Hollywood & Pope, 2009, p. 5). Perhaps this lack of information 
sharing occurred because, at the time the information became available, its 
significance was not known. This inability to recognize the significance of an 
observed activity can result in a failure to take appropriate action, such as 
sharing the observation with other agencies or acting upon it to prevent a terrorist 
act from occurring. One police officer responding to one call of suspicious 
activity, being unaware of the seemingly unrelated information from other 
sources, might not have enough background to make the connection that the 
activity this person has become aware of would make the connection, when 
examined in the context of information from other sources.  
b. Inbuilt Schemas 
Dr. Fathali Moghaddam describes the notion that humans are 
predisposed to make sense of sensory inputs through “inbuilt schemas” that 
“predispose us to synthesize the streams of information reaching us,” and that 
“constructs,” or “particular ways of viewing the world,” tend to shape a view of the 
world and situations in which inadequate information exists (Moghaddam, 2001, 
pp. 29–31). Consistent with this identification of difficulty in assessing information 
without bias is the notion of tunnel vision. Intelligence analysts expect continuity 
and thus underestimate the possibility that change might occur, and therefore, 
fail to identify “low probability/high consequence” events, and this phenomenon is 
reinforced due to the long gaps between significant unusual occurrences, which 
cause both a “physical and psychological” impact of surprise attacks—a mindset 
known as “cognitive bias” (Rovner & Long, 2005 p. 623). 
c. Cognitive Challenges 
In What Makes Intelligence Analysis Difficult?: A Cognitive Task 
Analysis, the authors conducted a study of the cognitive challenges associated 
with the task of intelligence analysis, and identified a number of “cognitive 
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challenges” faced by the analyst that fall within the scope of human frailty, as 
summarized as follows (Hutchins, Pirollo, & Card, 2007, pp. 298–304). 
 Time pressure. The requirement to produce reports for decision 
makers under stressful time constraints can cause “channel 
thinking” down a specific path, in which analysts are required to 
produce assessments without adequate time to develop 
background knowledge. 
 Multiple sources of information. Analysts must merge together 
multiple types of information, each with its own set of factors that 
may impact interpretation; and the analyst may not have familiarity 
with these varying information types. 
 Uncertainty. This notion relates to the cognitive bias described by 
Rovner and Long, and to Moghaddam’s discussion of “constructs.” 
A strong correlation exists between the “context in which data 
occurs and the perspective of the observer.” When faced with great 
degrees of uncertainty, the capacity of the analyst to assess data 
based on context sensitivity will likely be diminished.  
 High mental workload. Analysts are faced with continuous streams 
of incoming information, which must be evaluated, synthesized, and 
aggregated, which causes trade-offs to occur as these cognitive 
analytical tasks compete for attention with other requisite tasks. 
 Potential for error. The high workload imposed on analysts 
increases the likelihood that errors may occur, including the 
possibility of tunnel vision discussed earlier, in which an analysis 
may be “skewed when analysts attempt to reduce their cognitive 
load by focusing on… data they understand” and ignoring 
information with which they have less familiarity or context. 
D. LIMITS OF HUMAN NATURE 
Michael Handel, a student of intelligence failure, feels that the principal 
cause of such failure is the “limitations of human nature,” and most failures occur 
because decision makers fail to adapt their concepts to new information (Diaz, 
2005). This human dependency must be removed. Unfortunately, the ISE system 
is exposed to these inherent weaknesses. The system itself is flawed at the most 
fundamental level because rather than control for the vulnerabilities 
characterized by Handel, it relies upon them. 
 48
In a relevant and stunning example of human failure, the limits of human 
nature essentially prevented the New York Police Department (NYPD) from 
sharing critical information concerning the imminent collapse of the North tower 
with the New York Fire Department (NYFD), and thus, the urgency of evacuating 
the tower was not properly conveyed to members of the fire service (Pfeifer, 
2007, p. 208). Situational awareness was available to one agency and not 
another, despite the fact that both agencies were directly involved in the same 
situation and would both be impacted by the eventual outcome that this 
awareness suggested. As with the failure of the FBI and CIA to share information 
on 9/11 hijackers, and the failure of police to act on information supplied by 
fishermen in Mumbai, this situation was less a technical radio interoperability 
issue as it was a process issue, since commanders and personnel from both 
agencies were within close proximity of one another (Pfeifer, 2007, p. 211). Turf 
battles, organizational arrogance, group theory, and social identity issues defined 
the long-term alienation between these agencies, issues that existed between 
the agencies prior to 9/11 as a fundamental part of the system that defined 
interagency cooperation (or lack thereof), and that became even more apparent 
when that system was stressed with the critical input if a catastrophic event, 
leading, in this case, to a loss of life that perhaps could have been prevented if 
these systemic flaws had been addressed prior to the event. Whatever the 
motivation for failure to share information in these examples, they all involve 
human beings required to make decisions, who made the wrong ones. The time 
to fix these problems is not during an unplanned crisis, but prior to the crisis. If 
the system had been optimally functioning in advance, it might have produced a 
more desired outcome during the event. 
Human limitations in imagination, stove-piping, institutional arrogance, and 
turf battles are the product of people, who themselves suffer from human frailty. 
Human error itself is embedded in the organizational processes that embody the 
error (Grabowski & Roberts, 1996, p. 2). Research suggests that simply focusing 
on fixing the superficial errors themselves does not address fundamental process 
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issues in the system and will not effectively solve the underlying problem 
(Edmondson, 1996, p. 9). The ISE process does not address these fundamental 
issues, since the system depends on human decision making to determine what 
information elements to share, and with whom. Pfeiffer argues the need for the 
use of a unified command system during emergency events (Pfeiffer, 2007, p. 
213). This kind of system must be in place all the time, so that when an 
unplanned emergency occurs, the process is already in existence. The 
behavioral economist Dan Ariely suggests that when faced with too much 
complexity, humans take the easiest of the possible decision points, even if that 
decision point is to do nothing (Ariely, 2008). In the case of an analyst faced with 
a complex set of indicators that may or may not require the completion of a SAR 
submission, in this framework, the analyst may decide to take the path of least 
resistance and simply do nothing at all. The current ISE process requires the 
analyst to take deliberate action in the face of complexity.  
E. MITIGATION OF HUMAN WEAKNESS 
In the case of the ISE, the system itself needs to be designed in such a 
way as to mitigate human weaknesses that are an inherent part of any system 
that a human being designs. In many ways, the system is a reflection of the 
inherent flaws in all humans, and since it is possible to recognize this situation in 
advance, the opportunity exists to optimize the system before a critical event 
occurs, not after one has already happened, at which point, of course, it is too 
late. 
Events present themselves to us in a distorted way. Consider the 
nature of Information: of the millions, maybe even trillions, of small 
facts that prevail before an event occurs, only a few will turn out to 
be relevant later to your understanding of what happened [because 
your memory is limited and filtered]… (Taleb, 2007, p. 12).  
Categorizing always produces reduction in true complexity. It is a 
manifestation of the Black Swan generator… Any reduction of the 
world around us can have explosive consequences… (Taleb, 2007, 
p. 16). 
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The above quotes from The Black Swan discuss weaknesses in the 
human ability to process, interpret, recall, and classify information, which from a 
larger perspective, relate to the narrative of human frailty; which will be a key 
topic of this thesis. Taleb discusses the “highly improbable consequential event” 
(Taleb, 2007, p. 18), otherwise known as the Black Swan, as one that is 
unexpected and has consequential impact. The author would go a step further 
and suggest that any event that is unexpected, regardless of the consequence or 
perceived consequence, needs to be considered in the same category as a Black 
Swan. In other words, the author does not  think it is the level of impact that 
matters as much as the level of surprise, because even an event that by itself 
might not have a significant impact, could, when part of a sequence of errors or 
dependencies, ultimately have a profound impact. Taleb successfully 
summarizes the inherent human weaknesses associated with the process of 
identifying a discrete component of information and the dependence upon a 
human analyst who must assess the relevance of this component of information 
and determine that it is important enough to be entered into the environment for 
sharing. This process relies upon the same human frailty that presents itself in 
the Black Swan phenomenon, people are bad at assessing things objectively, 
partially because of memory, history, poor filtering, clustering, and a variety of 
other biases and limitations of imagination.  
Consider the events surrounding 9/11, and the fact that no one at the 
airlines or at the FAA that day had ever dealt with multiple hijackings before, and 
were thus, not expecting them. Therefore, human frailty played a role in a delay 
in notification to other transatlantic flights concerning hijackings after the first 
report of possible problems. To quote The 9/11 Commission, “As news of the 
hijackings filtered through the FAA and the airlines, it does not seem to have 
occurred to their leadership that they needed to alert other aircraft in the air that 
they too might be at risk,” and when a United Airlines dispatcher finally took it 
upon himself to generate warning messages to United transatlantic flights, the  
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cockpit crew of United 93 did not believe the warning, with the pilot responding in 
puzzlement “Ed, confirm latest mssg plz-Jason.” (The 9/11 Commission Report: 
2004, p. 11).  
Frequent examples of similar kinds of situations demonstrate the point—
people just are not good at recognizing or processing things they do not 
understand, whether these things are Black Swans or Black Swans without the 
Impact—still unusual and unexpected events that people probably are not going 
to be great at identifying as significant, or in the case of the ISE process, as 
important enough to warrant a SAR submission.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The range of human frailty was described and specific cognitive 
challenges faced by intelligence analysts were outlined. The ISE was compared 
with the reference models identified earlier. It described a maturity model in 
which value and complexity of various systems can be measured, which shows 
that the ISE scores poorly in these measurements. The concept of Big Data, 
which involves the ability to leverage and process massive amounts of 
information to enhance business intelligence, was described as requiring three 
things: volume, velocity, and variety. The reference models all score better in 
these areas than the ISE, by having more information, more quickly, and from 
more sources. Specific weaknesses of the ISE are apparent in the areas of a 
lack of information and reliance on human analysts to determine the value of a 
potential indicator before it can be reported and made available for further 
analysis, which can best be summarized as limitations of human nature and 
failures of human imagination. These failures are embedded in the organizational 
processes that embody the errors, in this case, the ISE program itself. The ISE 
needs to reduce its reliance on human processes that artificially prevent 
complete information from being made available for assessment and sharing. 
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This thesis argues that the ISE cannot meet its objectives of removing 
barriers to information sharing among local, state and federal homeland security 
agencies and providing a platform from which to connect the dots, or to extract 
“previously unknown… information from data” (Taipale, 2003, p. 22).  
1. Weaknesses 
The ISE suffers from a lack of comprehensive information from which to 
develop situational awareness related to possible emerging conditions, which 
occurs because it relies on human gatekeepers that control information entry into 
the platform for analysis and because it lacks the advanced data analytics 
capabilities to assess the data to identify previously unknown indicators of 
potential pre-terrorist incident activity. When compared to other reference 
models, such as FinCEN, or when assessed from a Business Intelligence 
maturity perspective; or when examined within the framework of Big Data, the 
ISE fails to provide the Volume, Velocity, or Variety of information to allow for 
analytics to transform information into actionable output. The ISE as it now exists 
(with the limitation of human dependency that translates into a lack of complete 
information) will probably not achieve high performance in the areas described in 
Chapter IV (facilitating the initiation of terrorist investigations, identifying criminal 
terrorists, facilitating the arrest of terrorists, identifying terrorist cells, making 
connections across criminal terrorist organizations, identifying and thwarting 
terrorist plots, and so forth). In fact, the current platform is designed to fail due to 
limitations, which is primarily centered on human frailty. When the Business 
Intelligence maturity model is used to measure the ISE, it scores at the lowest 
levels of complexity and business value because it cannot support in-depth 
analysis due to a lack of volume, cannot tell what is happening now due to a lack 
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of velocity, and cannot predict what might happen in the future due to a lack of 
variety. ISE does a poor job even at this lowest-possible maturity level as 
suggested by the comparatively low percentage of SAR submissions referred for 
follow-up investigation when contrasted with FinCEN. This situation occurs 
because the environment has built-in limitations related to a lack of complete 
information, reliance on humans, which present weaknesses that limit their ability 
to evaluate information properly during the assessment phase, and a lack of 
analytical tools to make the information useful by identifying non-obvious 
relationships across and among data elements from various sources. When 
exploring effective models from non-traditional sectors, such as the military, other 
nations, and advanced data prediction implementations, the ISE exhibits stark 
differences, such as a lack of mandatory submission standards, a lack of 
integration of data sources, a lack of variety of sources, and a lack of advanced 
analytics capabilities. Almost by definition, the ISE will do a poor job of detecting 
emerging threats in areas inconceivable today, since the entire process is 
focused on SAR submissions that rise to the level of “suspicious” as determined 
by a series of human beings who must identify and document this suspicion 
based upon their imagination and ability to perform this function correctly.  
The ISE does not deliver the volume, velocity, or variety of information 
required to exploit Big Data to find meaningful, actionable intelligence within the 
data, which is to separate the “wheat from the chaff” and improve the system’s 
fidelity, or the signal-to-noise ratio of actionable intelligence to information 
(Lowenthal, 2009, p. 72). Thus, the ISE cannot meet its design objectives 
because it lacks information, relies on humans at too many stages of the 
information fusion process, and does not leverage advanced information 
processing necessary to transform the data into actionable intelligence, which 
leads to an inquiry on how the ISE platform can be refined to overcome the 
aforementioned limitations and to understand better and make transparent the 
influence of human bias on the various phases of the system.  
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2. Potential for Improvement 
Such modifications could take several courses. The precursor to FinCEN 
evolved over time from detecting financial crimes to include the role of detection 
of terrorist financing. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 established the first reporting 
requirements for certain financial transactions, and over subsequent decades, 
additional requirements were added and information-sharing capabilities were 
enhanced (History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws, n.d.). The ISE itself was born 
from a catastrophic event, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, just as 
the PND was developed as a result of a catastrophic crime. Will it take another 
catastrophic act to demonstrate that the ISE cannot perform as designed in its 
current implementation, and thus force a reactive adaptation after the loss of 
lives? Will it be necessary to wait four decades before it is realized that changes 
need to be made?  
An example of one path these enhancements can take is already in 
progress in the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to perform analytics 
on social media by looking for certain key words and phrases that might be 
indicators of potential pre-terrorist activities. The DHS National Operations 
Center (NOC) is authorized to analyze open source information from sources, 
such as Twitter, Facebook, and blogs to assist in forming a common operating 
picture and assessing situational awareness, in most cases without collecting 
personally identifiable information but rather to identify emerging activities with a 
potential nexus to terrorism (Written Testimony, 2012, p. 5). Ironically, this effort 
allows more information from the open source social media space to be available 
for real-time assessment than sources created or maintained by the organs of 
local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. The characteristics of this 
assessment platform, including the measures of volume, velocity, and variety, 
would likely achieve a higher score and maturity level than the ISE itself. 
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3. Bottom-Up Approach 
The DHS open source social media analytics activities are an example of 
a top-down national approach; developed, implemented, and managed by a 
federal agency in Washington. Another path might follow a process that better 
respects U.S. core constitutional values and engenders public support, by 
starting from a local or state decentralized bottom-up approach rather than a 
federal top-down method. Using a fusion center model, state or regional data-
sharing efforts could be developed that would integrate many of the 
characteristics of an effective information-sharing platform. These regional 
databases could then be linked, with each forming a node on a national, 
interoperable information exchange platform that is managed by state and local 
entities and respects values of state and local communities, while realizing the 
objectives of accessibility to other partners. This process could occur in 
partnership with privacy advocates, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, 
which would then have a stake in helping to develop guidelines for privacy 
controls that still ensure effective outcomes for keeping local communities safe. 
Involving local law enforcement agencies as core contributors to the process will 
help guarantee that tests of criminal predicate are met in accordance with 
existing laws and constitutional values, and will also recognize some of the 
founding principles upon which this nation was built that traces its history back to 
the American revolution itself: that government and policing should occur at the 
local level, not at the level of the “King,” where it was very far away. In other 
words, policing should not occur at the level of the “king-father” but rather at the 
“local level… in the town… perhaps the colony” (Dubber, 2005, p. 83). This local 
approach might allow the dual requirements of respect for privacy and 
comprehensive access to information to be met. In addition, a distributed 
architecture with local control allows “privacy protection by diversifying control” 
(Taipale, 2003, p. 42). Rather than the “king” ensuring privacy, the people are 
ensuring it through their local government agencies.  
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A regional or local “system of systems” is proposed, in which fusion 
centers are responsible for the management of databases at the local agency 
level that form a comprehensive, multi-mode platform for “persistent surveillance” 
using both human analysts and automated analytics processes, and in which 
information with a connection to crime that needs to be pushed up to the national 
ISE, is vetted and pushed once identified. Two forms of the ISE would exist, 
regional and national, or in other words, a Multi-ISE. Transparency is a critical 
part of gaining public trust for this process to work. The FinCEN annual report is 
filled with performance metrics on the number and type of submission to the 
environment. The ISE annual report is filled with one qualitative survey on levels 
of participation at various agencies. Public trust will be gained by sharing 
whatever performance metrics and characteristics can be disclosed without 
compromising system security. 
4. Privacy Issues 
In an outstanding article entitled “Data Mining and Domestic Security: 
Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of Data,” K. A. Taipale provides a discussion 
of data privacy issues and suggests that technology itself can include safeguards 
to protect individual privacy rights through the use of “selective revelation” that 
can apply technology controls to shield the exposure of a person’s individual 
identity while alerting to potentially relevant suspicious activity through data 
analysis, and thereby, allow due process considerations to be followed before 
specific identity is revealed (Taipale, 2003, p. 66). Consistent with Taipale’s 
suggestion, this thesis argues that the system itself can include privacy 
protections while still meeting the objectives of identifying potential pre-terrorist 
incident indicators across various databases.  
In Terror and Consent, Bobbitt describes an approach that is exactly 
opposed to the state and local-centric method proposed in this thesis, an effort to 
develop an information assessment platform with similar goals to the ISE that 
resulted in the resignation of the project’s director, Admiral John Poindexter. The 
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project, known as Total Information Awareness, was a series of research 
initiatives to define hypothetical profiles consistent with imagined terrorist attack 
scenarios, and then canvassing huge quantities of data to detect terrorist 
preparation efforts in pursuit of the implementation of the imagined scenarios. 
Even though various controls were established, such as the requirement that 
detailed access to personal identifier information would have required approval 
from an outside authority, Congress “killed the project completely” after “inept 
public relations,” including the use of a “pseudo-Masonic all-seeing eye… 
blaz[ing] forth from the pyramid depicted on the Great Seal of the United States” 
(Bobbitt, 2008, p. 338). This project is a lesson on exactly what not to do to 
engender public support, a system directed by an Admiral at the Pentagon using 
a symbol that conjured images of mind control and suggesting that the military 
could see everything from its Masonic eye.  
Although not a perfect approach from a technical perspective since some 
level of human review is still needed to approve data for sharing from the 
regional ISE to the national ISE, it removes the key barrier to efficacy in the 
current ISE, manual human approval for entry into any sharing environment. 
While not a Panopticon, the Multi-ISE will see more than it sees today.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are discussed.  
1. Minimize human dependency and expand volume, velocity and 
variety 
2. Add analytics capabilities 
3. Make reporting requirement mandatory 
1. Minimize Human Dependency and Add Volume, Variety, 
Velocity 
Complete information must be made available at the regional level, 
without relying upon humans to review and decide whether or not such 
information can be shared. To realize the inclusion of unfiltered information from 
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a wide variety of sources that would be accessible across jurisdictional lines, 
various rules need to be followed. 28 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) Part 23 
establishes standards that determine when information on subjects can be 
placed into multi-jurisdictional databases, and stipulates that “…the officer 
submitting the [individual, organization, group or business], must have enough 
information” to believe that the entity is involved in criminal activity, and such 
information cannot be part of an extra-jurisdictional database “automatically” 
unless such specific criminal belief can be articulated, and information on source 
reliability and validity be tracked for each subject entry (28 CFR Part 23: A 
Guideline). The regional or local approach would allow information to be stored in 
local agency databases that would then become nodes to a larger assessment 
platform; filters would not be necessary at this level, which would remove at least 
one barrier from the information entry gateway. Automated analytics could then 
assess this information at the local agency level and identify those elements that 
might allow an analyst to articulate a specific criminal belief, and thus, share this 
information across jurisdictional lines. An argument can also be made that in the 
case of some critical information sources, such as criminal incident reports, 
arrest warrants, arrest reports, and reasonable suspicion stops, a reasonable 
suspicion that a crime will occur or has occurred is intrinsic to the data, and thus, 
the specific criminal belief test would successfully be met, and thereby allow 
these elements to be shared with the national ISE. Volume would be increased 
as the human gatekeeper would no longer limit potentially critical data from 
reaching the environment. Velocity would be improved as the human delay point 
would be eliminated, and direct integration with allowable data sources would 
improve timeliness. Variety would be expanded based on additional access to 
direct data sources.  
2. Add Analytics Capabilities 
To reach the highest state of Business Intelligence, advanced data 
analytics capabilities would need to be added to the platform by utilizing 
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predictive and “Big Data” capabilities. Big Data refers to massive sets of 
information that exceed traditional approaches to collection, storage, and 
analysis and that demand new methods to leverage (Franks, 2012, p. 4). 
Working groups, including participants from the commercial, academic, military, 
health care, and criminal justice spaces, would need to participate in an effort 
similar in complexity and probably cost to the most complex technical efforts 
undertaken by human kind. Volume, velocity, and variety must be present: 
enough information, without delay, and of adequate breadth and scope to allow 
Business Intelligence activities to occur that will allow the data to be useful. 
Analytics need to occur at the regional and national levels. Thus, machines are 
assessing vast quantities of information, conditions outside the baseline of 
expected activity, and performing the functions they are good at, but the human 
analyst is still performing critical functions assisted by new analytics tools and 
informed by more data from more sources.  
3. Make Reporting Requirement Mandatory 
Perhaps most importantly, SAR submission to the regional ISE, along with 
approval for sharing critical information with the national ISE, must become 
mandatory. The reference models discussed in this thesis, including FinCEN, the 
PND, and the military’s use of persistent surveillance, do not allow discretion to 
play a role in event submission, this occurs either automatically (in the case of 
direct access to source data from the various INTs, for example; or on a 
mandatory basis when certain criteria are met (in the case of FinCEN), which 
effectively removes at least one potential point of failure, an analyst lacking 
imagination to recognize the potential value of a component of information and 
failing to submit it. The ISE needs both, real-time access to automated 
information sources along with mandatory SAR submissions when analysts 
become aware of suspicious activity that might have a nexus to terrorism. 
Reporting should not be optional.  
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Privacy proponents will overwhelmingly oppose these recommendations. 
Utilizing the bottom-up approach will enable this strategy to be implemented with 
the support of the public and with the involvement of privacy advocates, who will 
prefer this method to the top-down federal approach. Individual states will be free 
to establish criteria for SAR submissions and automated data transfers based 
upon community standards and the capabilities of the agencies that comprise the 
local jurisdictions. Some states, due to levels of technology advancement, may 
be required to adopt a manual process for some information entry. The key to 
this approach is the decentralized, local control that will allow for greater potential 
for public acceptance. Since data is collected at the local level primarily for local 
use, the processes and procedures for collection, verification, and updating such 
information are also local, as are rules that might vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction (Taipele, 2003, p. 42), which is both the position of this thesis and of 
Taipele.  
Figure 4 depicts this Multi-ISE scenario, in which no human barrier exists 
to information entry to the regional ISE; in addition, a human vetting process 
occurs before information may be pushed to the national ISE (with some 
exceptions, if allowable, for those data sources that represent criminal activity, 
such as arrest reports, criminal incident reports, and reasonable suspicion stops).  
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Figure 4.   Preferred ISE/SAR Environment 
Systems and processes need to be designed to compensate for human 
frailty whenever possible, to the extent practical, given that humans, of course, 
design the systems and processes themselves. A system can be designed so 
that as many points of human decision making as possible are removed, and 
remaining human decision points can be spread across a group of people, and 
ideally, in different locations to remove the danger of cross contamination to help 
ensure that the dependency is not limited to a single point of failure. Humans will 
always be involved in various stages of the intelligence analysis process, but 
removing barriers to information availability will at least allow for the concept of 
“multiple advocacy,” which ensures that multiple analysts with varying viewpoints 
have access to complete data from which to perform analysis activities, and 
thereby, reduce the negative potential impact of human bias (Butterfield, Jr., 
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1993, p. 55). The challenge is to remove barriers while protecting the rights of the 
public. In Terror and Consent, Bobbitt suggests that, “Most of the rules that have 
hamstrung U.S. agencies in the wars against global terrorism are not 
constitutional in nature,” but rather arose from the 1970s and the “ugly” practices 
by some federal agencies disclosed after Watergate (Bobbitt, 2008, p. 318). As 
Bobbitt suggests, “some increases in the power of the State may increase, or at 
the least do not diminish, the liberties of the People” (Bobbitt, 2008, p. 314). An 
opportunity thus arises to begin trusting the government with additional power to 
ensure that liberties remain intact.  
C. THE PATH FORWARD 
The ISE was established to address key intelligence failures that occurred 
prior to 9/11. In its current state, it cannot meet its design objectives because it is 
hampered by a lack of data necessary to form a complete operating picture and 
lacks analytical tools to identify emerging conditions, patterns, and trends across 
data elements. This lack of information is due to an overreliance on the human 
decision-making process, which creates an unnecessary barrier to information 
entry. When compared to reference models, such as FinCEN and the PND, and 
private sector best practices, the ISE performs poorly in key measurement areas, 
such as volume, velocity, and variety of information necessary to provide an 
effective assessment platform. It is impossible to assess its performance 
completely, due to limited and largely qualitative, anecdotal reporting metrics 
when compared to more mature platforms, such as FinCEN. In its current 
manifestation, the very lack of human imagination that is at the root of most 
historical intelligence failures (including 9/11) is not only present but amplified in 
the ISE, which thereby ensures that this same lack of imagination will limit the 
performance of this platform. 
To address these shortcomings, the successful national fusion center 
model, in which regional centers engage in the intelligence process at a 
decentralized level, should be strengthened and should allow appropriate 
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information to be aggregated up to a centralized assessment framework. In this 
way, process rules can be established and enforced at the regional level, under 
local and state control, with a more comprehensive level of data available for 
assessment from all potential sources (including such areas as open source 
social media and police databases, in addition to suspicious activity reports 
completed by human analysts). Concepts of Big Data, such as information 
volume, velocity, and variety, can be integrated into these regional centers, which 
can develop analytics tools for assessment and identification of patterns and 
trends at the regional level. The national ISE can access appropriate, allowable 
information from these regional centers, with privacy controls built in to the 
systems themselves. For example, personal identifier information can be stripped 
from the data shared to the national platform, which would still allow analytics to 
occur but with references to contact local authorities to learn specific personal 
identities. The DHS, which takes a leadership role in the fusion center process, 
needs to become a champion for developing these improvements and an 
improvement plan to facilitate desired outcomes.  
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